We estimate the demand for primary schooling in rural Madagascar using information on the characteristics of local schools. Price and school quality figure importantly in the choice among non-enrollment, public school, and private school alternatives. Poor households are substantially more price-responsive than wealthy ones, implying that fee increases for public schools will have negative effects on equity in education. On the other hand, simulations of improvements in school facility attributes indicate that such improvements will tend to raise the enrollments of poor children disproportionately. An expansion of private primary schools to all rural communities at current prices would lead to only modest increases in overall primary enrollments, with the largest gains experienced by better-off households.
I. Introduction
The provision of free or largely subsidized education is among the most important and widely accepted functions of governments in developing countries. In Africa, however, after impressive successes following independence, governments have found it increasingly difficult to fulfill this function. Partly as a consequence of economic stagnation beginning in the early 1980s, public education systems in African countries have suffered from severe revenue shortfalls during a time when the school-age population has grown rapidly. Inevitably, the quality of public schools has fallen. Combined with falling household incomes, this has led at the primary level to stagnating or declining enrollments: in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, primary enrollments were lower in 1995 than they had been fifteen years earlier (World Bank 2000) . At the same time, growing dissatisfaction with the public education system has led to a rise in the demand for private schooling.
Governments in Africa are thus faced with the challenging tasks of improving school quality and restoring or increasing enrollment levels. A third important objective is to insure that public spending on education is progressive, that is, pro-poor. However, these goals are potentially in conflict. This is well illustrated by the controversy generated by proposals to impose fees in public schools (or to increase current fee levels). These strategies for costrecovery have the potential to ease the revenue constraints governments face, making investments in much needed quality improvements or new school construction more feasible. However, serious equity concerns have been raised: will the higher costs impinge the most on enrollments of the poor? To answer this question, we need to know the responses of households to changes in prices and how these responses vary by income group.
A complicating factor for policy (and analysis) is the presence of a private sector in education. Substitution between public and private school alternatives will influence the outcomes of education policies even when these policies are implemented only in public schools. For example, the negative enrollment impacts of public school fee increases may be offset by increased private enrollments. At the same time, the goal of the price increase, to raise revenue for the public schools, will be confounded by the exodus of fee-paying students from the public sector.
Private providers may be of superior quality, suggesting that an enhanced role for the private sector in education will improve overall human capital outcomes. However, discussion of private schooling inevitably invokes concerns over equity. The poor may not be able to afford better quality private schools; alternatively, the private option may simply not be available in areas where the poor live. Either factor will limit the ability of poor households to take advantage of private alternatives in response to declines in public school quality or increases in public school costs. If they are effectively priced out of the private sector, the poor will not benefit from its growth, which instead may exacerbate existing inequalities in the distribution of schooling or school quality, hence ultimately also in the distribution of economic opportunities and welfare. On the other hand, if the poor do not participate in the private education sector primarily because they do not have access to local private schools, a private expansion may actually benefit them disproportionately, with very different consequences for equity in the distribution of school enrollments and education quality.
The issue is important in light of the increasing interest in the private sector as a means of filling the gaps in the public delivery of education services, especially where resource limitations make further expansion of public facilities infeasible or where the quality of public services is poor. Just as they can discourage it, governments can use a variety of direct or indirect means to support the development of the private school system. In principle, public subsidization of private schools can serve as a policy lever for raising enrollments or education quality on par with investments in public school expansion or its quality.
Although a number of studies for developing countries have examined the role of price and quality in schooling decisions, very few have looked at how these factors influence the choice between public and private school alternatives, or explicitly considered the implications of the growth of the private sector in education. 1 We do this in the present study, taking advantage of a rich data set from Madagascar that includes information on the characteristics of local schools. We estimate the effects of changes in school cost and quality on the primary schooling decisions of rural households, incorporating the private sector as an alternative to public schools.
In addition, we clarify analytically the relationship between price elasticity estimates obtained from demand models and changes in the benefit (school enrollment) shares of different quantiles of the income distribution. We use the demand model estimates to simulate the impacts of changes in public school fees and other education policies on public as well as private primary enrollments and their distribution. Summarizing the main results, we find, first, that fee increases reduce public and overall (public plus private) primary enrollment proportionately much more for the poor than for the well-off, making the distribution of schooling less equitable. In contrast, the poor tend to benefit disproportionately from improvements in public school quality. Because demand responds strongly to changes in quality, there is scope for raising public school fees to pay for quality improvements while still yielding net increases in enrollment. We also find that an expansion of private primary schools to all rural communities at current prices would lead to only modest increases in overall primary enrollments. The largest gains, moreover, would be experienced by children in better-off households, suggesting that concerns about the equity implications of private sector growth in education are justified.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical strategy. Section III describes the institutional background and the data, and Section IV presents the results of the estimations and policy simulations. Section V concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the results.
II. Model and Empirical Specification Model of school choice
Our empirical model is based on previous literature, but features several departures from the standard approach. As usual, parents are assumed to derive utility from the human capital of their children, which is a function of their schooling, and on all other consumption. Faced with the three alternatives of enrollment in public school, enrollment in private school, and nonenrollment, parents choose the alternative that brings the highest utility. Define Y i as household income and P ij as the costs to the household of choosing schooling option j (inclusive of fees and other direct expenses as well as the value of the forgone household or farm production of the child if j is chosen). Consumption net of schooling is therefore (Y i -P ij ) if option j is chosen. Also let S ij be the increment to the child's human capital associated with a year's enrollment in j. A number of functional forms for utility have been applied in the econometric literature. A simple linear specification of utility conditional on school option j, similar to that used in different contexts by Mwabu et. al. (1993) and Akin et. al. (1985) , is V ij = a 0 S ij + a 1 (Y i -P ij ) + e i j
where e ij is a random disturbance term. The S ij term, representing the increase in human capital, is expected to vary across school options (one of which is no school at all), primarily because the quality of the alternatives may differ. Since this change is not directly observed, a 0 S j is replaced by a reduced form equation for the utility from human capital: a 0 S ij = γQ j + δ j X i + n i j
where Q j is a vector of school quality variables and X i is a vector of observed household and individual characteristics. This can be thought of as incorporating a production function for human capital in which both school and household variables (e.g., parental education) are inputs (variables such as parental education may also affect utility from schooling directly, as taste shifters). Substituting into (1) yields
where ε ij = e ij + n ij . δ j , the coefficients on household and individual factors which are constant across alternatives, are indexed on the alternative. As is well known, this is necessary because the choice of provider is based on comparisons of utilities for different alternatives, meaning that variables that do not differ across options would be eliminated from the decision rule unless their effects were allowed to vary across options. Also as is well known from the literature (see Gertler et. al. 1987 ) this applies to the income term in this linear model. Since a 1 is not indexed on j, theY i term drops out of the decision rule.
2 Therefore the only way income can directly affect choice in this model is by allowing the coefficient on income to differ by alternative, an approach which Gertler et. al. criticize as being inconsistent with the basic postulates of utility maximization . Gertler et. al. propose a different means of permitting a role for income, by specifying a form for conditional utility that is quadratic in net income. We return to this issue below. For now, we maintain the simple linear utility specification since it provides a convenient basis for discussing several other specification issues.
The first issue is the problem of estimating the school choice model with incomplete cost information. Cost or price is a key variable in the model, but it is often very difficult to obtain an accurate measure of schooling costs from the data. As noted, these include both direct costs and the indirect (opportunity) costs of a given school alternative. Reflecting data limitations, it is common to include only one component of costs to represent all schooling costs. To consider the implications of this for the estimates of price effects, define P j m as the measured component of cost and P ij u as all other school costs, the unobserved costs. Then total cost P ij = P j 
This is the 'true' model. The actual net consumption variable used is just Y i -P j m , however. This sets up the possibility of a bias in the estimate of a 1 , which we can interpret as a form of omitted variable bias. It occurs if the unobserved costs correlate with the included net consumption variable, or more specifically, with either of its elements Y i or P j m .
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In our case we can obtain information on direct costs from the household survey since it collects information on expenditures on fees and other school-related items for each child attending school. The opportunity costs of schooling are more troublesome. Conceptually these are equal to the hours of market or home production foregone when the child attends school multiplied by the opportunity cost of time for the child. In low-income rural settings these costs can be important, even for primary age children. Glick (1999) reports that in rural areas of Madagascar some 40 percent of boys and 30 percent of girls age 7-14 participate in incomegenerating work, primarily in agriculture; for girls in this age group household work is also significant. Where few children actually work for a measured wage, however, obtaining an accurate measure of the value of time is difficult. This was the case with our data. Fewer than 2 This is obvious if we write equation (1) as V ij = a 0 S ij + a 1 Y i -a 1 P ij + e ij . Option j is chosen if V ij >V ik , all j≠k, which is equivalent to a 0 (S j -S k ) + a 1 (Y i -Y i ) + a 2 (P ij -P ik ) > e ik -e ij . Hence the terms containing Y i are eliminated.
3 Since the income term Y i drops out of the estimation in this linear model, one would be correct in arguing that only if P ij u (not P ij u or Y i ) is correlated with the included price term P j m is there a bias in a 1 . However, while this is true for the linear specification, as discussed below, most studies include interaction terms such as Y i P j m to insure that income does play a role in the choice among school alternatives. The coefficient on the interaction captures non-linearities in the price effect and since the interaction includes Y i , it will be biased if there are omitted cost factors that are correlated with income. 100 rural children between the ages of 6 and 12 reported working for a wage in our survey, and wage regressions on this sample yielded almost no significant coefficients. 4 To deal with the problem of missing indirect schooling costs, we treat this part of cost as an unobserved variable that can be parameterized as a function of measured individual, household, community and school factors. This is akin to the way unobserved schooling outcomes or human capital improvements were treated above. Many of the relevant factors, such as age and sex, already appear in the model as demand shifters X i . We assume for simplicity that all X i are also contained in the vector of determinants of P ij u while a set of other household or community determinants of P ij u , designated by Z i , are not in X i . Including as well school-related factors that affect unobserved costs and assuming linearity we have:
Z i might include agricultural and other productive assets, and community characteristics that affect farm or enterprise profits. Through their effects on the marginal return to the labor of the child, these factors influence the opportunity cost of schooling. School factors Q j may affect opportunity costs through differences in distance and travel times and in the time a child is expected to devote to study outside of school hours. The error terms v ij and u j capture the influences on indirect costs of unobserved individual/household/community factors and school factors, respectively. Substituting (5) into (4) and rearranging yields:
where γ* = (γ -a 1 c 3j ) δ j * = (δ j -a 1 c 1 ) ξ i = -a 1 c 2 ε ij * = {ε ij -a 1 (v ij + u j )} Estimation of (6) will yield unbiased estimates of the price effects if, conditional on Z i as well as X i and Q j , the disturbance term (v ij + u j ) is independent of net income. The bias will not be completely eliminated if there exist determinants of P ij u that are excluded from Z i and are also correlated with the elements of net income. In practical terms, the model differs from the previous specification by the inclusion of covariates Z i that influence unobserved indirect costs. Some of these variables might not be among those typically entered in a schooling demand equation; however, the foregoing discussion implies that this expanded vector of right hand side variables corresponds to the correct reduced form model when opportunity costs are not directly measured. In our specifications we include covariates such as the value of agricultural assets, detailed household composition variables, and dummies for location (province), as each of these may affect either the demand for or the productivity of a child's labor, hence the opportunity costs of attending school. We also add a number of indicators of community infrastructure such as presence of a road or a local market, which also may affect the returns to child labor. Note from (6) that the coefficients on variables such as age and sex that are in both X i and Z i capture both direct influences on demand and indirect impacts through their effects on unobserved school costs.
There is a second, and distinct, specification issue. The standard formulation of utility as a function of household consumption net of schooling (Y i -P j ) imposes the restriction that the coefficient on income is the same (times -1) as that on price, as can be seen clearly from (6). However, there are plausible situations in which the income and price coefficients may diverge. Perhaps the most likely case is where, as originally suggested by McFadden (1981) , unmeasured tastes that affect utility from an alternative are systematically related to household income. The implications of this can be seen by adding to the model a parental "taste" variable T ij that is unobserved by the researcher, i.e.,
(In this and what follows, we ignore the distinction between X i and Z i to simplify the exposition and use the former to represent them both). T ij can be thought of as representing preferences for schooling, or more precisely, for different schooling alternatives; this implies indexing on the alternative as shown. Assume that the association of these tastes with income can be represented by the simple parameterization T ij = λ j Y i + ω ij . Then substituting in (6′):
where b j = a 1 + dλ j . The coefficient on Y i differs from the price coefficient in this model and is indexed on j since it captures in part the effects of tastes that vary by alternative. Hence we have the following general function:
in which a 1 is identified from the price parameter (it is equal to -α 2 ). In contrast to the standard linear model, the effect of income is not eliminated by differencing, because its coefficient varies by alternative.
So far we have been discussing elaborations of the linear conditional utility model. More favored in recent empirical work are models that are nonlinear in the consumption variable, such as the quadratic model of Gertler et. al. (1987) mentioned above. The quadratic specification yields an interaction of income and price, thereby permitting the effects of price, and price elasticities, to vary with income. This provides a flexibility that is often justified empirically (as well as allowing income to affect choice in the absence of choice-varying income parameters). An alternative to this, which we use in this study, is to interact consumption with dummy variables indicating the per capita expenditure quintile of the household. 6 This yields the following conditional utility function for option j (extending equation 6, that is, maintaining for the moment the constraint relating the income and price parameters):
The dummy variable E k (k =1,..,5) equals 1 if the expenditure per capita of the individual's household falls in quintile k and zero otherwise. The model thus yields separate price responses for each quintile. This specification is more flexible than the simpler quadratic form in terms of allowing non-linearities in the effects of income on price responses.
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If we extend the reasoning above to this model and allow separate income and price coefficients we have the following specification:
where α 2k = -a 1k . Note that, if rather than this equation, the appropriate model is given by (8), the terms containing Y i do not enter the likelihood function; as in the simple linear model they difference out of the decision rule, although income does exert an effect through the pricequintile terms. Hence estimation using (8) is equivalent to specifying conditional utility simply as
This is the same as equation (9) without the income terms Y i E k (given α 2k = -a 1k ), suggesting a simple test of the relevance of omitted taste factors in schooling choices, and by extension, of our specification of separate income and price effects. The assumption (implicit in the standard model) that income-proxied preferences are not related to utility from different alternatives is seen to impose a zero restriction on the choice-indexed income coefficients. We examined this for all variants of the school choice model, and in all cases likelihood ratio tests rejected the null 6 Gertler and Glewwe (1992) adopt a similar approach. 7 In our case as in other cases (see, e.g., Younger 1999) the quadratic specification yielded positive predicted price responses for a significant portion of observations at the upper end of the expenditure distribution. 8 We should note that a simplification is being made in (8). In the model with parameterized unobserved school costs, the coefficients on school and household characteristics have a more complex form, because each Q j and X I that is also a determinant of P ij u should, strictly speaking, also be interacted with each quintile dummy. This implies the more general function
If there were no direct effects of the interactions on V ij , it would be possible to identify the structural parameters c 1 and c 3j from the coefficients on the interaction terms X i E k and Q j E k . For example, given the estimate for a 1k (from the kth coefficient on the consumption term), c 1 could be solved for from the coefficients on X i E k . However, c 1 would be overidentified since for a given variable in X i the interaction of the variable with each expenditure quintile k would yield a different estimate of c 1 . The same applies to c 3j (and also to c 2 , the coefficients on Z i which we have suppressed here). Because we are not directly interested in these structural parameters, and to keep the model reasonably parsimonious, we work with specifications like (8), in which (δ j -c 1 Σ k a 1k E k ) and (γ -c 3j Σ k a 1k E k ) are approximated by the single parameters δ j * and γ* respectively. that the α 1kj were jointly equal to zero at the 5 percent level or better. Hence equation (9), including the income terms to control for omitted tastes, is our preferred specification.
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Given the functional form for conditional utilities and the decision rule, we can derive the demand functions, that is, the probabilities of choosing each school option, once we make an assumption about the functional form for the disturbances. As in many previous provider choice studies we estimate the probabilities as nested multinomial logits. This is a generalization of the multinomial logit model that allows error terms to be correlated across alternatives within a subgroup of choices but not across subgroups. The nesting structure we adopt assumes that the error terms of the schooling choices, which in the present case consist of public school and private school, are correlated. An additional, less typical, aspect of our estimations is that the probability expressions are adjusted to accommodate the fact all individuals do not have the same number of schooling options from which to choose. In particular, the private school option is not available to many, indeed the majority, of households in our rural sample.
Policy simulations
We use the estimates of the school choice model to simulate the effects of a number of education policies, including changes in fees and improvements in school quality. The outcomes with which we are concerned in this study are enrollments, and in particular enrollments among poor households. Alternatively, many researchers attempt to measure changes in private welfare using compensating or equivalent variations. While this approach is useful, well known problems of externalities and imperfect information mean that the private benefits of education are likely to be significantly below the social benefits (Selden and Wasylenko 1995) . This makes an evaluation of policies based on schooling outcomes rather than changes in individual welfare of equal or greater interest for our analysis.
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Since a major objective is to assess the distributional aspects of alternative education policies, it is important to carefully define what we mean when we say that a particular policy, such as a change in school fees, is beneficial or harmful to the poor relative to the non-poor. For our analysis we distinguish two ways of measuring the distributional effects of policies. We illustrate the concepts using as an example a change in school fees.
Many econometric demand studies (e.g., Gertler et. al. 1987) base their discussions of the distributional implications of changes in fees on comparisons of price elasticities of the "poor" and the "rich", i.e., lower and upper income quantiles. Here we make explicit the connection between elasticities and the distribution of benefits, which we will define in terms of quantile shares in aggregate enrollments. Higher price elasticities among low income households (the usual empirical finding) mean that, in proportional terms, the poor's reduction in demand from a given percentage increase in price will be greater than that of the rich. Proportionately larger reductions in demand (enrollment) in turn mean that the share of the poor in total enrollments falls-in other words, the incidence of primary schooling becomes less progressive. Formally, define E j as the enrollments of the jth quantile and E as total enrollment (so j's benefit share is E j /E), e j as the price elasticity of the jth quantile and e as the overall or average price elasticity, and P as the price level. It is straightforward to show that the change in the benefit share for quantile j resulting from a change in the price is:
The elasticity of the share with respect to price is simply e j -e. Hence j's new benefit share after the price increase will be less than its initial share if e j exceeds (in absolute value) the average elasticity. Thus the comparison across income quantiles of the elasticities derived from behavioral models permits (inferential) comparisons of the distribution of benefits before and after a price change or other policy.
The foregoing involves the comparison of average benefit shares before and after the policy is implemented and is the first of the two measures of distributional outcomes that we will consider. It is of interest as it shows how the targeting of benefits to the poor changes as a result of a particular policy. However, we also are likely to be interested in the marginal shares, i.e., the quintile shares in the aggregate increase or decrease in school enrollments resulting from the policy. Do lower income quintiles incur a disproportionate share of the reduction (or increase) in benefits? For this the relevant indicator is what we will call the "relative marginal share", equal to the change in enrollments of quintile j over the mean quintile change in enrollments:
where k is the number of income quantiles (e.g., 5). If this ratio equals unity, j incurs an exactly proportional share of the aggregate gains or losses, while values less than (greater than) one imply disproportionately small (large) gains or losses. This measure is distinct from the change in the average benefit shares described above; in fact, it can easily lead to an opposing assessment of distributional outcomes. For example, consider a situation in which the initial incidence of the benefit is highly regressive, so that the share going to the bottom quantiles is very low. It would not be hard in this case for a program expansion to yield an increase in these quintiles' average benefit shares (a rise in E j /E) even if the distribution of the marginal benefits strongly favors the non-poor (i.e., the relative marginal shares for the poorest quintiles are less than 1). Intuitively, when initial benefit levels for the poor are low, even small absolute increases can mean large proportional increases, which will tend to raise the share of this group in the total benefit.
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We would not consider the benefits of such a program expansion to be well targeted to 11 Formally, quantile j's average share will rise as long as its marginal share exceeds its average share. To see this, recall that the condition for an increase in j's share is that e j > e. Using the formulas for elasticities and rearranging terms, this can be expressed as:
the poor, despite the fact that the average incidence has become more progressive. Therefore it is important to examine the marginal quantile shares, not just the change in the average shares, when assessing the effects of a policy on the poor.
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For the policy simulations reported in this paper, therefore, both criteria will be considered. In reporting the quintile shares (and changes in them), we define the quintile in which an individual resides using the distribution of per capita household expenditures for the national Madagascar sample. However, since rural areas tend to be poorer than urban areas, the lower expenditure quintiles are disproportionately represented in our rural sample. We make an adjustment for this by calculating the ratio of the share of each quintile in total rural enrollments to the quintile's share of the rural population. Thus for the share of the jth quintile we
, where N is the total rural population and N j is the number of rural residents belonging to quintile j. This ratio equals one if the portion of rural enrollments accounted for by the quintile is the same as its share of the rural population; it is less than (greater than) one if the quintile's share of enrollments is less then (greater than) its population share. Note that this measure can be defined equivalently as the quintile specific enrollment rate divided by the overall enrollment rate.
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For marginal shares the analogous measure is
; the notation reflects the fact that the simulations involve discrete changes in enrollments. The relative marginal share measure defined earlier is a special case of this measure for which N j is the same for all k quantiles, so that N j /N equals 1/K.
As the foregoing indicates, the simulation exercises involve the distribution of rural enrollments among rural residents in different expenditure quantiles. However, it is straightforward to use the data and estimates of household responses to assess the nation-wide distributional implications of policies, e.g., quality improvements, that are implemented specifically in rural areas. To do this we need only replace the quintile's rural population share by its national population share in the ratio of benefit shares to population shares. The results of these exercises will also be discussed below.
indicating that j's share will increase if its share of the marginal benefits exceeds its average, or initial share. The point raised in the text is that when j's average share is low, this is a weaker condition than that j receives a disproportionate share of the marginal benefits. 12 We should point out that disproportionate enrollment reductions for the poor do not imply that a price increase or other policy is "regressive" in the sense that the welfare loss would be larger for poorer households than rich households. In fact, greater responsiveness to price on the part of the poor would suggest smaller (absolute) consumer surplus losses for the poor from a price increase (Dow 1995) . Our focus, as we have stressed, is on the distribution of enrollments, not household welfare.
13 Note that these rates are being defined as benefits (enrollments) per capita, rather than per child, in line with standard benefit incidence analysis. In section IV, in contrast, we begin by examining the distribution of enrollments specifically among school age children, which amounts to comparing per child enrollments across quintiles. In this case this the benefit share ratio will be calculated as the quintile's share of enrollments over its share of the rural school-age population, rather than its share of the total rural population.
III. Institutional Background and Data The education sector in Madagascar
Madagascar realized impressive gains in expanding access to schooling after independence in 1960, when education was made free for all children. Together with increases in the share of the government budget allocated to education, this resulted in a rise in gross primary enrollment from 50 percent to well over 100 percent by the early 1980s (World Bank 1996) . After the early 1980's, however, enrollments began to decline at all levels, and particularly for primary school. Gross primary enrollments fell from about 140 percent in 1980 to less than 80 percent in 1993/4. One reason for this was the country's overall economic decline and the consequent rise in poverty during the period. However, it is likely that another contributing, though related, factor was the deterioration in the quality of public schools, a reflection of the inadequate and (from the late 1980s though mid-90s) falling share of education in the government budget (World Bank 1996) . Judging by efficiency indicators such as repetition and dropout rates (cited in World Bank), the quality of schooling in Madagascar is indeed poor both absolutely and in relation to other countries in the region.
The private sector in education, while still relatively small, has been expanding steadily, apparently in response to dissatisfaction with the quality of the public system. An interesting characteristic of private primary schooling in Madagascar is that it is dominated by church-run (both Catholic and Protestant) schools. Only 15 percent of private primary students overall, and an even smaller percentage of rural private primary students, attend secular schools.
Data
This study uses data from the Madagascar Permanent Household Survey (l'Enquête Permanente auprès des Ménages), collected in 1993-1994. The EPM is a comprehensive, multipurpose nation-wide survey of 4,508 households that was supplemented by a community survey which includes information on local schools. Our analysis focuses on children of primary school age (6 to 12) excluding those (very few) who had already graduated primary school by age 12. For each currently enrolled child the household survey records annual school expenditures on fees, books and uniforms, transportation, and other direct costs. The price variable used in the school choice models is the community (Fokontany) median of these direct expenditures for each primary school type (public or private). Costs are substantially higher for private schools than public schools, reflecting much higher fees as well as higher expenses for other school items: the mean of community median annual expenditures for public primary school is 6,088 Malagasy Francs compared with 16,957 Fmg for private school (Table 1) . The latter sum is a non-trivial portion of mean household per capita expenditures of 222,000 Fmg.
The community questionnaire was essentially limited to rural areas; less than 10 percent of the sample covered by the community survey is classified as "urban" and even for these cases "semi-urban" is probably a more accurate designation. Information was collected for each Fokontany on the schools (up to a maximum of three) that were used most frequently by households in the Fokontany. The following were recorded for these schools: distance and transportation costs, maximum class size, numbers of students and teachers, sharing of rooms by different classes, and several indicators of facility condition. In about a third of the communities with a public primary school more than one such school was recorded, and in slightly less than 20 percent of communities listing a private school there was more than one private school recorded. In these cases we used the characteristics of the closest school of the given type in the estimation. 14 A shortcoming of the community survey is that the listed schools do not always exhaust the universe of available schools. We infer this from the household survey data, which show that in some rural communities children are attending a primary school type-usually private-that is not enumerated in the community survey.
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In other cases we faced essentially the opposite problem: the school type (again usually private) was listed in the community questionnaire, but none of the sampled households in the community had children attending it. Hence we were not able to use the household survey data to construct a local price (community median school cost) for these schools. It was necessary to drop individuals living in communities that had partial information for either of these reasons. 16 We also drop a smaller number of observations in several communities for which school characteristics could not be unambiguously matched to information on school type. These adjustments lead to a sample reduction from 2,675 to 1,820 children age 6 to 12 residing in 120 Fokontany.
With such a sample reduction selection bias is a potential problem. This will occur if the dropped communities differ systematically from those that are included in the estimation in terms of unmeasured characteristics that affect schooling demand. Our data do not allow us to address this concern using standard selection correction approaches. However, as described below, we can make use of a number of community-level covariates that we would expect to be correlated with unobserved community schooling preferences. If these covariates fully capture unobserved differences in schooling demand between selected and other communities, the problem can be interpreted as a "selection on observables" problem (Fitzgerald et. al. 1988) . Table 1 shows non-enrollment and public and private primary enrollment rates for the sample of children age 6 to 12 by household per capita expenditure quintile. There are large differences by expenditure level in primary enrollment status. Fully 60 percent of the children in 14 In all of these cases the nearest school of each type is also the first one listed in the community survey, hence also (given the structure of the questionnaire) the one most frequently used by residents of the community. An alternative would be to use averages of the schools of each type, though this would probably assign too large a weight to the second or (very rarely) third school listed. The results using averages were in any case similar to those using the characteristics of the nearest schools. 15 These schools failed to make the community survey list because they were less "important" (i.e., less frequently used) than the listed schools. Hence we find that in communities where no private primary schools are listed in the community survey but in which there nevertheless are private students in the household survey data, the number of private students is generally very low: in fact in about half of such cases the community has just one recorded private primary student. 16 Initially we dealt with the second missing data problem by assigning imputed prices derived from hedonic price regressions (using school and community variables as regressors) estimated on the non-missings sample. However, the estimates of price effects in the provider choice model proved to be very sensitive to the specification of the hedonic regression. Because of this lack of robustness, we instead drop observations in communities with missing price data. the poorest quintile do not attend school, compared with just 27 percent in the richest quintile. Private school enrollment is far less prevalent than public enrollment, but the private share rises sharply with expenditure quintile. Although this pattern is consistent with private schooling being too expensive to be a realistic option for poorer rural households, differences in availability may also be behind the lower private enrollments of the poor. As shown in the table, private school availability-defined as such a school being listed in the community survey-is generally low (23 percent on average) but rises with quintile. Thus the well-off are more likely to be living in communities served by a private school. We investigate the importance of access below by simulating the effects on private (and overall) primary enrollment of relaxing the constraint on availability.
Information on the characteristics of the nearest schools of each type is presented in Table  2 . To the extent that these indicators are proxies for school quality, the figures imply that rural private primary schools are of higher quality than public schools. For example, simultaneous use of the same room by different classes occurs in 56 percent of private schools compared with 67 percent of public schools. Indicators for facility condition show more of a difference. Thus for example, 40 percent of the nearest private schools have windows in "good" condition (none or few broken) compared with just 6 percent of public schools. Unfortunately, the information on school quality is somewhat limited in the community surveys: we do not have data on other measures of quality such as availability of supplies and teacher education.
Additional cross-tabulations (not shown) show that better-off household have access to slightly higher quality local schools, a pattern that holds for both public and (where available) private schools. Wealthier rural households thus appear to be doubly advantaged: they live in areas with greater access to private primary schools, which based on the measures available are of higher quality than public schools, and they also enjoy access to somewhat higher quality schools of either type. Even for the highest quintiles, however, the data highlight the poor condition of rural primary schools, especially in the public system. The indicators for building condition for public schools suggest that these schools generally are in a state of disrepair, while the room sharing and student-teacher ratios point to overcrowding as a significant problem.
IV. Empirical Results

Nested logit results
The parameter estimates from the nested logit model of primary school choice are shown in Table 3 . Reflecting normalization, the estimates show the effect of the explanatory variables on the utility from a particular school alternative (public or private) relative to utility from the base option, non-enrollment. With regard to the specification of the interaction terms involving the expenditure quintile dummies, in our rural child sample there were relatively few observations from the highest quintile, reflecting the fact that wealthier households have fewer children as well as our use of quintile rankings based on the national expenditure distribution (the richest households tend to be urban). Therefore in creating the interaction terms we combined the fourth and fifth quintiles into a single category.
The coefficients on price (annual direct schooling costs) are negative for each expenditure quintile and significant for all but the highest quintile level.
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The price coefficients decline sharply in absolute value as income rises, indicating that the poor are more sensitive to changes in school costs. While theoretical considerations suggest that the price effects should be the same across alternatives, Dow (1999) argues for the plausibility of differing price responses for each alternative. A likelihood ratio test could not reject the equality of the price coefficients for public and private school (p= 0.47) so the restriction is maintained in our estimation. With this restriction maintained, we were also unable to reject the equality of the income coefficients for the two choices, so these parameters are also constrained to equality in the estimation.
The estimates for the primary school attributes indicate that public school quality plays a significant role in parents' schooling decisions. The sharing of classrooms by multiple classes has a strongly significant negative impact on utility from public school. Since classrooms in most rural public primary schools in Madagascar are small while class sizes are large (as seen in Table 2 the average maximum class size is 45 in public schools), it is quite plausible that there would be a strongly negative effect of room sharing on children's ability to learn, hence on the demand for public schooling. Good condition of windows, which may be acting as a proxy for overall facility quality, also has a significant (positive) impact for public school. These results are in line with the limited evidence from elsewhere in the region on the effects of school infrastructure on primary enrollments. Michaelowa (2000) , using a pooled sample from four African countries (including data from Madagascar that are different from the data used here), finds a negative effect on learning outcomes of a room sharing indicator similar to ours. The study by Lavy (1992) on Ghana also points to the importance of school facility measures (e.g., leaking or unusable classrooms) in primary enrollment decisions.
For private school, on the other hand, these school characteristics have no significant effects. A plausible explanation for this is that the marginal effects of school quality improvements on student achievement are larger at lower initial levels of quality; hence the effects on demand of such improvements will be greater for public schools, which as seen above appear to be of lower quality than private schools.
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The distance to the nearest school has the expected negative effect for public school. There is no equivalent effect for private school, but this may reflect in part the way information on providers was collected. Schools that were the furthest away (which would tend to be the case more often for private schools) are more likely to be excluded from the list of the most important schools recorded in the community survey, hence from the set of choices in the model. Gender 17 As in most previous studies, household consumption net of schooling is expressed in per capita terms, hence the price and expenditure price terms in the model are divided by household size. Results using total rather then per capita values were similar, with the exception of an anomalous positive price effect for the highest income category.
18 Initial specifications also included the ratio of the total number of students to the number of teachers. The coefficient on this variable was insignificant for private school but for public school had the "wrong" -i.e., positive-sign. This is a common finding (see Alderman et. al. 2001 ) and probably reflects the fact that high local demand for a particular school results in larger class sizes. Hence this variable seems particularly susceptible to simultaneity problems. For this reason as well as because of unreliable or missing data for a number of cases (e.g., zero or missing reported students or teachers for the school), we dropped this variable from the final specification.
has no impact on utility from either public or private primary school relative to non-enrollment, a finding that is consistent with the descriptive data for Madagascar showing similar primary enrollment rates for boys and girls. Consistent with virtually all other studies of education demand, parents' schooling-especially secondary attainment, which is rare in rural areasraises the demand for both school alternatives.
With regard to household composition variables, researchers typically report a negative association of schooling and family size, possibly reflecting the fact that there are fewer resources per child, all things equal, in larger families. We find such a negative association for private school but not for public school.
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A greater number of adults raises the demand for either primary school type, possibly reflecting an association of this variable with the level of household resources, that is, an income effect. Recall, however, that the interpretation of the coefficient on this and other covariates is ambiguous due to the implicit treatment of unmeasured school costs. A greater number of adults thus may also be encouraging enrollment by reducing the need for a child's labor, i.e., by lowering his or her opportunity cost of time.
Although our results for school quality are in line with expectations, it is possible that the coefficients on the school attribute variables are picking up the effects of unobserved community factors that affect both local school quality and the demand for schooling. This is a concern in part because the quality of a Fokontany's public primary school may be a function of the level of financial support coming from parents, hence of community preferences for schooling. If the errors in the individual utility functions incorporate community level preferences that are correlated with local school quality, the estimates will yield upwardly biased measures of the impacts of quality. To assess this possibility, we added several community level variables, including the average education of household heads, median Fokontany household expenditures per capita, and an indicator of rural location. These controls are expected to correlate with unobserved local preferences for, or constraints on, schooling. Conditional on these controls, therefore, the correlation of school quality covariates and unobservables will be reduced, lessening any bias in the coefficients on quality.
As shown in Table 4 , the introduction of these variables has relatively minor impacts on the estimated effects of school characteristics, including distance. Therefore the endogeneity of school quality does not seem to be a serious problem in our estimates. Moreover, the estimates for the price-quintile terms are by and large very similar in both specifications. Hence our key estimates-those relating to school attributes and price-are robust to the inclusion of community controls. This also alleviates, at least in part, the concerns raised in section III about selection bias due to the exclusion of communities with missing data. 20 19 Rather than causality from family size to schooling, the result may reflect heterogeneity among households: e.g., "traditional" parents who prefer larger families may also have low preferences for schooling. 20 Section III noted that the sample selection issue could be considered in terms of a selection on observables problem. This is also implicit in our use of community controls to deal with potential endogeneity of school quality, since in both cases these observable community factors as assumed to capture community heterogeneity in schooling preferences. For the former problem, Barnow et. al. (1980) extended Heckman's sample selection correction model to deal with selection on observables by specifying the expectation of the outcome variable as a linear function of the structural regressors (school quality here) and the expectation of the error term conditional on the observables (the community covariates here). The specification in Table 4 is a form of this model We estimated one more specification, this time adding a number of local infrastructure variables available in the community survey, including indicators of the presence of a paved road, a local market, fertilizer availability, and presence of an electrical or water supply station. As noted, these factors should affect the local return to labor, hence may be used as additional controls for child opportunity costs (and possibly also for household income). The value of the household's agricultural land was also included for this reason. However, almost none of these variables approached statistical significance, and their inclusion did not notably alter the estimates for the other covariates. To the extent that community infrastructure does affect schooling demand by altering opportunity costs or agricultural incomes, these effects are likely already captured by our location (province), household expenditure, and community median household expenditure variables. Table 5 presents price elasticities for public and private schooling by expenditure quintile, calculated from the parameter estimates and the data. Since the responses to price changes will depend on the availability of alternatives, we calculate the elasticities both for the full sample (for which a public school but not necessarily a private school is available) and for the subsample of observations in communities with both a public and private school option. Column 1 shows for the full sample the quintile means of the own price elasticity of public schooling. Overall, the demand for public primary school appears to be inelastic-the mean elasticity for the sample is -0.18 (it should be kept in mind that this is the elasticity with respect to direct, not total, school cost).
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Reflecting the pattern in the parameter estimates, however, there are large differences by quintile in the elasticities. The public school elasticity declines from -0.27 for the poorest quintile to barely -0.05 for the richest. Note that the public price elasticities for the bottom two quintiles are each larger than the sample mean elasticity while for higher quintiles the elasticities are below the mean. Based on the discussion in section II, this implies that the first two quintiles' shares in aggregate public enrollments will fall from a public school fee increase while the shares of higher quintiles will rise.
The cross price effects on private school enrollment appear to be very small (column 2), but this largely reflects the fact that for the majority of observations in the full sample private schools are not available. In column 3 we calculate for the full sample the net primary schooling elasticities, which show the change in overall primary demand (public or private) with respect to a change in the cost of public schooling. This measure is of interest as it incorporates the substitution into the private sector as a result of the public school cost increase. As expected, the net elasticities are smaller than those for public schooling. Still, the differences are not greatthe mean net elasticity is -0.15 compared with -0.18 for the own elasticity-again reflecting the limited availability of substitutes for local public schools for the overall sample. _______________________________________________________________ in which the conditional error expectation is approximated by a linear function of the community variables, along the lines suggested by Ziliak and Krecker (2001) . 21 In this and subsequent tables, the "all" row gives the average taken over the full subsample being considered. This is not the same as the mean of the quintile-specific averages; the two diverge because there are more children in lower quintiles, which thus have larger weights in the calculation of the overall mean.
As we would expect, for the smaller sample for which both school options are available, the own price elasticities for public school and the cross-price elasticities are both larger and the net primary schooling elasticities are smaller (columns 4-6). In an absolute sense the cross elasticities are not large, indicating that parents do not perceive public and private schools as very close substitutes. Finally, the last three columns show the private school price elasticities for this subsample. The own price elasticities are larger on average than those for public school, but as with public school, they generally decline in absolute value with expenditure quintile.
Most studies of developing countries find a positive association of the level household resources and schooling outcomes (Behrman and Knowles 1999) . Among other factors this association may reflect credit market imperfections that prevent households from borrowing against the future earnings of their children to finance their schooling. As with price effects, it is difficult to assess income effects directly from the parameter estimates in our model, reflecting the nonlinearity of the logit specification as well as the presence of the price-quintile interactions. Therefore we calculated enrollment probabilities at different levels of expenditures controlling for other covariates. This was done for the overall sample and for subsamples defined by the type of school options available (detailed results available from the authors). We find that income has strong effects on enrollment and school choice. For example, for the sample with only public school available and controlling for other factors, the predicted primary enrollment probability for a child in a household with the mean expenditures of the top quintile (585,760 Fmg) is close to double (0.59 vs. 0.31) that for a child with mean expenditures of the bottom quintile (104,245 Fmg).
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Further, we find that where private schooling is an option, it will account for the bulk of the increase in enrollments resulting from a rise in household resources.
Policy simulations Increases in public school fees
To make the discussion of price effects in the preceding section more concrete, our first simulation investigates the changes in rural primary school demand that would result from an increase in annual public school fees of 5000 Fmg (about US $2.50). This is a large but not unrealistic level for new fees in a strategy of cost recovery. It represents a major increase over the level of fees currently charged by public schools but such fees are mostly nominal, averaging well under 1000 Fmg. The total direct costs of public school (the bulk of which are accounted for by uniforms, books and other supplies) are about 6000 Fmg, so an increase of 5000 Fmg would represent somewhat less than a doubling of current direct costs. Even with such a policy, public schools would remain significantly less expensive than rural private primary schools; as seen above, the mean annual cost of the latter is about 17,000 Fmg. 23 22 These estimates imply an income elasticity of enrollment of about .20, though it should be kept in mind that we are considering a far from marginal change in expenditures. This is large relative to the median of 0.07 found for all developing country studies in the survey of Behrman and Knowles (1999) but is consistent with their observation that the income elasticities are larger among the poorest countries. 23 Note that a 5000 Fmg increase would constitute a small, if non-trivial, percentage of mean rural household per capita expenditures (about 222,000 Fmg). Table 6 shows, for each school type and for overall primary schooling, the predicted current quintile enrollment rates (i.e., the average predicted probabilities at current school costs), the predicted enrollment rates after the price change, and their difference, the changes in enrollment rates. The figures in parentheses correspond to the benefit distribution measures discussed in section II: they show the initial quintile shares in aggregate rural enrollments, the quintile shares after the price change, and the quintile shares of the change in enrollments, each divided by the quintile shares of the rural primary school-age population. As noted, the first two measures are equivalent to the ratio of the quintile-specific enrollment rate to the sample mean enrollment rate while the third, the relative marginal share, is the ratio of the quintile change in enrollment rate to the sample mean change in the enrollment rate.
The bottom row of the third column indicates that the average public enrollment rate for the sample declines by 5 percent (from 0.44 to 0.39) if direct school costs increase by 5000 Fmg, equivalent to a proportional decline of 11 percent. This average disguises important differences by expenditure quintile. The enrollment reductions are concentrated among children in the lower quintiles-in fact for the top two quintiles there is almost no reduction. Comparison of the relative marginal shares highlights these differences. For example, for the second quintile this ratio is 1.5, meaning that the share of the aggregate decline in public enrollments accounted for by children in this quintile is 50 percent larger than its share of the rural primary age population. In contrast, the ratio for the richest quintile is barely 0.25.
The second distribution measure we consider is the change in average benefit shares, indicated by the figures in parentheses in the first two columns. As we anticipated from the pattern in the price elasticities, the shares of public enrollments (relative to shares of the school age population) decline for children in the first two quintiles and rise for higher quintiles. Therefore public school fee increases will make the distribution of public school enrollments less well targeted to the poorest rural children.
The increases in private enrollments from the public fee increase are small across the expenditure distribution (column 6). This reflects the lack of private alternatives for much of the sample as well as the modest cross-price elasticities for those who do have access to private schools. Consequently, the main substitution response is toward non-enrollment rather than private schooling, and the reduction in overall primary schooling is only slightly smaller than for public school alone (column 9).
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In terms of distributional outcomes, the reductions in overall primary enrollments, like those for public enrollments, are much larger for the poorest rural households: primary enrollment rates of the bottom two quintiles decline by 6 and 7 percent, respectively (15 and 13 percent in proportional terms), compared with barely 1 percent for each the top two quintiles.
We have been examining changes in net primary enrollment rates-i.e., the percentage of primary school age children enrolled. Closer in spirit to standard benefit incidence, on the other hand, would be a comparison of benefits (enrollments) calculated on a per capita rather than per child basis. The two approaches can yield different conclusions.
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Since poorer households tend to have more children, there are more children (or equivalently, children per capita) in lower expenditure quintiles. This means that the poor's benefits per capita will be larger than their benefits per child, or in our terminology, their average benefit shares will appear larger on a per capita basis. For the same reason, poorer quantiles will also account for a larger share of a change in aggregate benefits when viewed through a per capita rather than per child lens, all things equal. All the simulations in this paper were therefore also calculated using predicted enrollments per capita as the outcome measure; to save space we describe rather than present these results (they are available from the authors). For the fee increase, considering marginal shares first, poorer households (especially the bottom two quintiles) account for a disproportionate share of the reductions in public as well as total primary enrollments, as in the per child simulation. However, reflecting the larger number of children relative to adults in lower quintiles, the differences between upper and lower quintiles are even more pronounced than in the per child case. Further, whether measured on a per child or per capita basis, the distribution of rural public enrollments becomes less pro-poor as a result of a price increase for public schooling (the average share ratios fall for poorer quintiles).
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Quality improvements
Next we simulate the effects of investments in public school quality, represented by our indicators of classroom sharing and facility condition. Table 7 shows the effects on per child public, private, and overall primary enrollment probabilities of eliminating classroom sharing in all public schools where room sharing currently occurs; that is, the variable for sharing of classrooms is set to zero for these observations and the probabilities for each school alternative are recalculated. The average increase in the public enrollment probability is 7.4 percent. This figure is the mean for all observations, including those experiencing no change in school quality (i.e., those for whom the room share variable initially equals zero). For the sample excluding these cases, the change in public enrollments is a quite substantial 11 percent, equivalent to a 26 percent proportional gain.
Moreover, the third column indicates that the increases in public primary enrollment rates of children in the bottom three quintiles, taken as a group, are larger than for the top two quintiles; in other words, a disproportionate share of the marginal enrollment benefits accrue to children from poorer households. One factor contributing to this outcome is that poor households currently suffer from somewhat lower quality local public schools, proxied here by the room sharing dummy, so on balance they benefit most from the improvement. In terms of the average benefit shares, the bottom three quintiles each gain at the expense of the top two. 25 See Selden and Wasylenko (1995) for a good discussion of the relative advantages of the per child and per capita approaches.
26 Although these conclusions involve per capita rural enrollment shares, one usually thinks about incidence in terms of the overall (country-wide) distribution of welfare. As discussed in section II, this can be assessed easily, by substituting the national quintile population shares (which equal exactly 0.20) for the rural population shares of each quintile in the calculation of the quintile enrollment share ratios. The distributional outcomes for a fee increase in rural public schools (results available from the authors) are qualitatively similar to the simulations on the rural sample alone, reflecting the fact that Madagascar is largely-almost 80 percent-rural. In fact, the negative equity implications are slightly more pronounced in the national sample because the higher price is assumed to affect rural areas only, which are disproportionately poor.
With respect specifically to the poorest quintile, note that although its average share of public enrollments rises, it actually receives a less than proportionate share of the incremental enrollments (the marginal share ratio in column 3 is less than unity). In other words, the marginal benefits are not well targeted to this group. This illustrates the point made in section II about the need to distinguish between the distribution of the marginal benefits and the change in the distribution of average benefits.
Since some households are induced to switch from private to public schools as a result of the improvement, the gains in overall primary enrollment rates (shown in the last column) are slightly smaller than for public school alone. However, the distributional outcomes with regard to overall enrollment probabilities, both in terms of the marginal shares and the change in the average shares, are even more favorable to the poor than the equivalent measures for public school enrollments. This is because the predicted school transitions of poorer children consist largely of moves from non-enrollment to public enrollment, whereas the better-off are (relative to the poor) more likely simply to be switching from private to public school in response to the quality improvement.
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If we consider rural enrollments per capita rather than per primary age child, the conclusions are qualitatively the same as in Table 7 , though as in the price increase simulations the distributional impacts are more pronounced when calculated on a per capita basis. From this perspective even the poorest quintile now receives a disproportionate share of the marginal benefits. Average enrollment share relative to rural population share rises for the bottom three quintiles, indicating that the per capita distribution of rural public enrollments will become more progressive when there is an improvement in public school quality.
28
In a similar exercise we simulated an improvement in public school facility condition, represented by the window condition dummy (to save space these results are not shown). The results were similar to those for the room-sharing variable. Again, the changes, especially for overall enrollments, were largest for the poor. A final quality improvement simulation considered a simultaneous improvement for public schools in each of the school quality variables in the model (eliminate room sharing, improve window and building condition). Essentially, this corresponds to an investment both in school expansion (to add classrooms) and in improvements in conditions in existing facilities. The benefits to enrollments were very large (public and overall enrollments rise an average of 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively), and again favored those in the first three expenditure quintiles. One caveat to these simulation results is that the estimated impacts of measured school characteristics may also be picking up the effects of unobserved dimensions of quality that are correlated with the observed characteristics. This would lead to an overestimation of the average demand response to increases in the latter, though the distributional patterns are likely to be robust.
Fee increases to pay for quality improvements
With estimates of the responsiveness of households to changes in price and quality, we are able to address the feasibility of financing quality improvements though increases in fees. This question has been addressed in a number of studies through willingness to pay analysis, which calculates the maximum income households would be willing to give up to see a quality improvement made (the compensating variation). We approach the question differently here, in a way more in tune with our emphasis on enrollment outcomes.
Policymakers are assumed to face multiple and conflicting objectives in the education sector. One such objective is raising primary enrollment levels. Another is to improve the quality of schooling, and finally, a third is to raise revenues that can be used to make these improvements. The simulations assume that the quality improvement is implemented and show the tradeoff between cost recovery (fee increases) and enrollment increases. The trade-off exists because while improvements in school quality induce more parents to enroll their children, higher fees are a disincentive that cuts into the gains in enrollments. At one end of the range of cost-recovery possibilities, the improvement is implemented with no increase in fees paid by households, yielding the maximum possible increase in enrollments. At the other end would be complete financing of the improvements through the fee increase. Unfortunately, we lack information on the costs of the improvements. These may be such that the fees needed for complete financing would push down enrollments to below their initial, pre-improvement levels. Since it is unlikely that policymakers in Madagascar would accept this outcome given the urgency of raising primary school enrollments, we may assume a practical upper boundary for cost recovery to be the level of fee for which the enrollment rate after the quality improvement is the same as its pre-improvement level. Table 8 illustrates the tradeoffs by simulating the effects on enrollments of instituting a specific quality improvement-the elimination of classroom sharing in public schools-while also raising public school fees. Since our school quality variables take the form of dichotomous indicators, we are simulating an improvement for a subset of observations-in this case, those in communities in which the room share indicator initially equals 1. We assume likewise that the higher fees are imposed only in these communities. The figure shows, for public primary and overall primary schooling, the initial mean enrollment probabilities, the probabilities after making the improvement, and the probabilities when the improvement is combined with public school fee increases of varying amounts.
Comparison of the first and second columns indicates the large gains in enrollment that would result from the improvement in the absence of accompanying changes in fees. As expected, increasing public school fees reduces enrollments, offsetting some of the gains. However, even with an increase in fees of 5,000 Fmg per student there will be a significant net gain in the average public primary enrollment rate of 6 percentage points (from 0.43 to 0.49; third row) over the pre-improvement level for this sample. The overall primary enrollment rate rises from 0.49 to 0.54 (bottom row). These enrollment benefits, of course, are in addition to the presumed improvements in learning outcomes from higher school quality. Even with a fee increase as large as 10,000 Fmg, mean levels of public and overall enrollments would be about as high as before the improvement was made. Because we lack the necessary cost data, we are unable to compare the potential revenue generated by such fees to the actual costs of making the improvement. 29 However, we can gain some perspective by recalling from above that 5,000 Fmg is close to the average of the total direct costs rural households currently incur to enroll a child in public primary school and is equal as well to a non-trivial fraction of the current per pupil government subsidy of 50,000 Fmg (World Bank 1996; this figure is the national average and may overstate the subsidy for rural areas).
The changes in enrollment rates just discussed are sample averages, however. As comparison of the rows for the poorest and richest quintiles indicates, there is significant variation around the mean, reflecting the greater responsiveness of poorer households to changes in school costs. While public and overall primary enrollments of the richest quintile register a substantial gain even when the quality change is accompanied by a 10,000 Fmg fee increase, for the poorest quintile there is a net loss in enrollments even at more modest fee levels. Therefore the ideal policy of cost-recovery for public school improvements would be one of differential fee increases-i.e., price discrimination-in which fees are raised more for the non-poor (either individuals or communities) than the poor.
Similar results (available from the authors) were obtained for a simulation of a change in facility quality represented by an improvement in window condition; in fact, the fee increases that could accompany such an improvement while raising enrollments by a given amount are even larger than in the previous case. These simulations suggest, therefore, that there is some scope for cost-recovery to finance quality improvements in rural public primary schools in Madagascar.
Expansion of the private education sector
Lastly, we address the impacts of an expanded delivery of private schooling services. In the rural Madagascar context it would not be particularly useful to simulate the effects of reducing private school fees (along the lines, say, of a voucher program), because the majority of rural residents do not currently have access to a nearby private school. Of more interest would be the impacts of an expansion of private schools into areas not currently served by them, which can be thought of as resulting from a government effort to expand access to education by subsidizing the development of new private providers. Initially we assume that the new private schools have characteristics, including fees and other direct costs, equal to the means of these covariates for existing private schools. We use these "data" and the model parameters to calculate new enrollment probabilities for each school type under the assumption that private school is an option for all households.
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As shown in the last column of Table 9 , overall primary enrollments would increase on average by slightly less than 6 percentage points if private schools were to become available in all communities. This is a modest change given that for about three-fourths of the sample the simulation is expanding the set of choices to include a private alternative. However, while the new private schools would not attract many currently non-enrolled children, there would be a significant reallocation of already enrolled children from public to private schools. Private enrollments as a share of total primary enrollments would rise from about 15 percent to 40 percent. This suggests that private primary enrollments are constrained by a lack of supply of private schools. One might interpret the partial reallocation to private schools as indicating a repressed demand for better school quality. If quality is indeed higher in private schools, the shift into the private system would mean a larger improvement in educational outcomes than suggested just by the small net increase in overall primary enrollments.
With respect to variation by expenditure quintile, the sixth and last columns show that the gains in both private and overall primary enrollment are larger for wealthier households. This is the case even though the private expansion disproportionately enlarges the set of school options of poorer households, who initially were the least likely to have access to a private school. For the poorest two quintiles the average benefit share ratios for overall primary schooling fall slightly (compare columns 7 and 8). Thus an expansion of private schooling at current prices, while modestly raising enrollments for all groups, would tend also to reduce the access of the poorest children to education relative to those who are better off.
On the other hand, because public enrollments fall proportionately more for higher income households, which are more likely than the poor to switch to private schools when they become available, the share of the poor in public primary enrollments rises. That is, the incidence of public primary schooling becomes more progressive, as indicated by the large decrease in the average public school share ratios for the two richest quintiles and the corresponding increase for the bottom two quintiles. Hence the simulation supports the hypothesis that the growth of the private education sector will make public education spending, if not overall primary enrollment, better targeted to the poor.
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Of course, this outcome would not be assured if the private expansion itself was not purely market driven but instead relied on government subsidies.
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A second simulation considered a more ambitious subsidization of private schooling. In this scenario private schools were again made available to all households but this time the annual costs of enrolling in the new schools were assumed to be only half the mean for existing private schools. The mean increase in predicted overall enrollments is slightly larger than before (about 8 percent for the sample overall). Further, the lower costs induce more low-income households to take advantage of the new schools, with the result that the increases in overall enrollment probabilities for the first two quintiles are now about the same as for the highest two. Hence a program that both insures greater private school availability and substantially reduces private school costs to households will potentially be equitable in terms of the distribution of additional 31 On this topic, see Hammer et. al. (1995) . 32 In contrast to our rural sample, private schools should be relatively accessible (in terms of location) to most urban households, even poor ones. Hence it is noteworthy that the EPM data for urban areas indicates that private primary enrollments, while generally higher, show the same pattern by quintile as in rural areas: the share of private in total primary enrollment in urban locations is just 0.18 for the first quintile compared with 0.65 for the highest quintile. This supports the implication of our simulation that the rural poor will be significantly less likely than the well-off to take advantage of private schools even if the constraint on availability was relaxed. primary enrollments. This obviously would involve a very large (though unknown) level of public subsidy.
V. Summary and Discussion
In this study we have examined the determinants of primary school choice among households in rural Madagascar. The estimation results indicate that the demand for primary schooling and the choice between public and private schools is responsive to changes in household income, school costs and (for public schools) school quality. The results help put in perspective the sharp declines in primary enrollments experienced by Madagascar beginning in the 1980s. These declines have been attributed alternately to falling incomes and a deterioration in the quality of the public school system over the period. Both trends indeed emerge as plausible factors in light of our econometric estimates.
Since the poor's demand for schooling is more price-elastic than that of the wealthy, prices increases for public schooling have negative implications for equity. By leading to larger proportional reductions in demand among the poor, increases in cost will make the distribution of public primary school benefits less progressive. Although the average declines in schooling from fee increases may not be very severe, policymakers considering cost-recovery strategies need to be aware of the potentially adverse distributional consequences of such measures. By the same token, of course, our results imply that an education subsidy applied uniformly across the income distribution will disproportionately benefit the schooling of poor children.
Our policy simulations indicate that improvements in rural public school quality will have large positive effects on public school enrollments. Since these increases come about primarily by drawing non-enrolled children into school rather than by inducing substitution from private schools, there are large gains in overall primary enrollment as well. Further, these improvements increase the enrollments of poor children disproportionately. In part, these favorable equity outcomes result from the kinds of improvements considered, since they rectify deficiencies that are somewhat more prevalent in the public schools of poorer communities. Therefore a policy that sought to raise public school quality to uniform levels would in effect target the enrollments of children in the poorest communities. Obviously, this will be more effective the greater is the variation between poor and non-poor areas in the school inputs that are affected by the policy.
Given public sector revenue shortfalls, an important question is the extent to which quality improvements can be financed through school fees. We find that significant increases in fees (relative to the current government per pupil subsidy) could be imposed to pay for investments in quality while still yielding an increase in average rates of public and overall primary enrollment. Given the greater price-responsiveness of low-income households, however, such a scheme will lead to undesirable equity outcomes unless it is set up to allow the poor to pay less than the wealthy. This is easier said than done. Means testing to exempt low-income individuals from fees is difficult for developing country governments to carry out, and the record in Africa has been poor (see Hamner et. al. 1999 ). However, it may be practical to adjust charges on a regional or village level basis, using mean levels of income or assets to determine the appropriate fee level.
Further simulations show that an expansion of private primary schools to all rural communities at current prices would lead to rather modest gains in overall primary enrollments. In contrast to quality improvements, the largest gains would be experienced by wealthy households. Therefore, unless public subsidies are used to significantly lower the costs of attending private schools to make them affordable to the poor, the growth of private primary schooling implies a stagnation or worsening of overall education equity.
A key piece of the policy analysis is missing in that we lack information on the costs of alternative education policies. Would public funds be better spent making improvements in rural public school quality, or in subsidizing the development of rural private schooling? Additional research on costs is necessary to answer this question. Still, the fact that public school quality improvements have larger and more pro-poor enrollment effects suggests that such investments would be an effective as well as equitable strategy for raising levels of human capital. Notes: Base choice is non-enrollment. For mother and father education, the excluded category is no schooling. The model also includes controls for province (Faritany). Computed from nested logit parameter estimates and data using analytical derivatives. Elasticities are computed for each observation; table shows overall sample and quintile means. "Public available sample" includes communities with public school only or with both public and private school available. a elasticity of public school probability with respect to public school price b elasticity of private school probability with respect to public school price c elasticity of probability of overall (public and private) enrollment with respect to public school price d elasticity of private school probability with respect to private school price e elasticity of public school probability with respect to private school price f elasticity of probability of overall (public and private) enrollment with respect to private school price 
